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Abstract
Many third world countries seem to fail to create a growth-promoting and peaceful in-
stitutional framework and are plagued by ethnic, religious or social conflict. This paper
focuses on the impact of primary commodities on group behavior and, thus, on the nature
of the resulting societies. Strategies are analyzed in a basic one-shot game with two players
and two strategies, in which priors vis-a-vis the other player matter. We show that poverty,
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1 Introduction
The past decade developed a vast literature, both theoretical1 and empirical2, on the possible
causes of the lack of third world economic growth. So far at least 90 different variables have
been tested empirically for their influence on economic growth (Durlauf & Quah [1999]). There
is, however, still no consensus on which factors determine economic growth, and thus, on which
variables are responsible for the lack of growth in certain countries and regions.
In the growth literature, literacy, investments in schooling and health care, macroeconomic
stability, political stability, openness to trade, investments in research and development, prop-
erty rights protection, core infrastructure, . . . , are repeatedly cited as determinants of economic
growth. This suggests that institutions matter. Presumably, the institutional framework3 in
many of the third world economies lacks those fundamentals (e.g. incentive structures, core in-
frastructure, openness) that are conducive to economic growth. A crucial question then becomes
what determines the outlook of this framework.
In this context, two branches of the development/growth literature are of particular interest.
First, the negative impact of resource-booms on the economic performance of a country is more
or less viewed as a stylized fact: theoretically, both the ‘Dutch disease’ idea and the ‘rent-
seeking’ literature emphasize the negative impact of resource booms on economic performance.
Moreover, “empirical studies have shown that this curse [the curse of natural resources] is a
reasonably solid fact” (Sachs & Warner [2001], p. 837).
The ‘Dutch disease’ idea argues that, due to the terms of trade windfall, natural resource
booms entail a shift in production, unfavorable to the non-resource tradeable sectors. By assum-
ing (more) ‘learning by doing’ (van Wijnbergen [1984]) or ‘increasing returns to scale’ (Sachs
& Warner [1999]) in the non-resource tradeable sectors, it follows that natural resource booms
frustrate growth.
The rent-seeking literature, on the other hand, emphasizes the impact of natural resource
booms on the relative returns to rent-seeking activities (Tornell & Lane [1999], Baland & Francois
[2000], Torvik [2002]). The limited supply of natural resources requires restricted access, thereby
(potentially) creating excess rents and, thus, stimulating/inciting rent-seeking. Moreover, since
natural resource booms increase relative returns to rent-seeking, they will, assuming that rent-
seeking is costly (Murphy et al. [1991, 1993]), impede growth.
Furthermore, a fascinating debate on the importance of ethnic diversity is still ongoing.
Some state that ethnic diversity within a centrally governed region tends to reduce growth,
while others argue that the influence of ethnic diversity depends on the political framework.
Easterly & Levine [1997] find empirical support for the negative effect of ethnic diversity on
policy choices. They argue that “ethnic diversity encourages the adaptation of growth-retarding
policies that foster rent-seeking behavior and makes it more difficult to form consensus for growth-
promoting public goods” (p. 1207). Alesina et al. [1999] too find support for the detrimental
impact of ethnic diversity on growth. By using a majority-voting model, they show that voting
on, first, the amount of taxation and, second, the type of public good results in fewer investments
in core public goods for a higher ‘median distance to the median voter’ (which reflects the
polarization of preferences). Moreover, their empirical analysis corroborates these findings.
Instead, Collier [1998, 2001] argues that the institutional and political framework matters.
The author makes a distinction between ‘ethnic dominance’ and ‘ethnic fractionalization’ and
shows, both empirically and with a majority-voting model, that “ethnically diverse democracies
do not have worse economic performance and are actually safer than homogenous societies”
(Collier [2001] p. 153).
1Solow [1956], Romer [1986], Mankiw et al. [1992], . . .
2Barro [1996], Benhabib & Spiegel [1994], Sachs & Warner [1997], Edwards [1998], . . .
3Note that, when talking about institutions, we refer to the definitions used by North [1978].
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Like Tornell & Lane [1999], the model we present allows us to link these two branches of the
literature. The mechanism described here, however, differs considerably from theirs. In their
model, groups decide on the fiscal transfers they extract and on the allocation of their capital
stock. In contrast, we present a simple one-shot-game, in which two groups, in order to maximize
own group utility, decide on whether or not to cooperate with each other. In this, the strategy-
choice depends on, among other things, the degree of resource dependence of the economy and
the level of trust among groups. Note, furthermore, that in contrast to the mainstream ‘natural
resource’-literature, we do not merely focus on resource booms: our model allows to analyze the
impact of both the degree of resource dependence and shocks in this degree.
Our model aims at linking primary commodity dependence and social group diversity to
the outlook of the institutional framework4. We consider a country inhabited by two social
groups and show that primary commodity dependence could influence group strategy. By using
basic game theoretic principles we show that a fully integrated society, where both groups
choose the cooperative strategy, is but one of the four possible equilibrium outcomes: (partially)
segregated societies with either of the two groups dominating and a conflictual society are the
other outcomes5. This means that under some circumstances rent-seeking from at least one
of the groups (in our model we call it fighting) or segregation proves to be utility maximizing
and even an equilibrium group strategy. This could explain some of the poor policy choices we
observe in (many) third world countries.
In section 2 we formalize the basic assumptions and the corresponding payoffs of the model.
Section 3 analyses the Nash equilibria that arise for different parameter values, while in section 4
we discuss the impact of trust on the resulting equilibria when beliefs are unconfirmed. Finally,
section 5 presents our conclusions.
2 Assumptions and payoffs
2.1 Assumptions
Let N be the population at working age in the region. αN is the size of the population belonging
to group K and (1− α)N is the size of the population belonging to group L.
Moreover, we assume that the economy contains two types of ‘activity’: rewarding jobs and
subsistence jobs. Every rewarding job generates a high net income, YR(> 0); the subsistence
jobs generate a net return normalized to be equal to zero, YS(= 0). A crucial variable in the
model will be the proportion of rewarding jobs in the economy, r ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that all
people belonging to N are employed in either of the two types of jobs. Hence, national income
is assumed to be: ni = rYRN .
Furthermore, both groups are assumed to have the following strategy space: either they
choose to cooperate (C) with the other group, or they choose to fight (F ). The cooperative
strategy reflects the fact that the group chooses not to favor members of the same group and
integrates and interacts with the other group. The fighting strategy on the other hand, should
not necessarily be interpreted in a strict sense; it just means that the group is willing to spend
resources (cf. infra) in order to protect and privilege its members or deems it lucrative to pursue
segregation. This results in four potential outcomes of the game: (C,C) when both choose to
cooperate; (F,C) when K chooses to fight while L chooses to cooperate; (C,F ) when the reverse
holds and (F, F ) when both choose not to cooperate. The following table shows the nature of
the corresponding societies:
4It is important to keep in mind that we use ‘social group diversity’ as a very broad concept: it ranges from
ethnic diversity or polarization to social class stratification.
5Note that the conflictual society will, after a strife for power between the two groups, also result in a (partially)
segregated society.
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(C,C): fully integrated society (C,F ):
(partially) segregated society
(L dominates)
(F,C):
(partially) segregated society
(K dominates)
(F, F ): conflictual society
Since the fighting option implies that the group decides to spend resources to assure that
the rewarding jobs are primarily granted to the group members, it generates a cost. If just one
of the two groups chooses not to cooperate, we assume that the rewarding income is reduced to
δ1YR, with 0 < δ1 < 1. This implies that national income decreases to rδ1YRN . This can reflect
a wide range of potential costs of non-cooperation, e.g., the misallocation of resources (less
trade, misallocation of talent), the negative incentive effects of nepotism and discrimination, the
impact of antagonism between groups on the (over-) exploitation of common resources, a lower
social capital stock, . . . . Moreover, if two groups decide not to cooperate, costs will be assumed
to be even higher since this situation could also generate costs of conflict (or even civil war).
The rewarding income is assumed to be reduced to δ1δ2YR, with 0 < δ2 < 1 (ni = rδ1δ2YRN).
It is important to note that we will assume that agents are risk neutral: their utility function
is linear in income. Moreover, we assume that there is no coordination problem or free riding
within a group.
Finally, we include a variable P (resp. [1 − P ]) that reflects the probability that when no
one cooperates the members of group K (resp. L) will manage to ‘capture’ the rewarding jobs.
2.2 The payoff matrix
The payoffs of the game are summarized in the matrix below. Let H ∈ {K,L} and X,Y ∈
{C,F}. uH(X,Y ) then represents the payoff of player H6 if player K plays strategy X and L
plays strategy Y . Note that uH(F, F ) is player H’s expected payoff, since the actual payoff is a
random variable in this case (see the definition of P ).
L
uH(C,C) uH(C,F )
K
uH(F,C) uH(F, F )
In this setting r will turn out to be one of the crucial parameters. Due to symmetry between
the case where 1 − α < α and α < 1 − α, we can limit the number of cases down to eight:
(1 − α) = α = 1/2 < r ‖ (1 − α) = α = r = 1/2 ‖ r < (1 − α) = α = 1/2 ‖
(1 − α) < α < r ‖ (1 − α) < α = r ‖ (1 − α) < r < α ‖ (1 − α) = r < α en
r < (1− α) < α.
Here, however, we focus on the situations where (1 − α) < α < r, (1 − α) < r < α and
r < (1 − α) < α. These three cases incorporate all the important aspects of the model; the
remaining five do not add any essential new insights. For the sake of completeness, those five
cases are analyzed in A.
3 Nash equilibria
In this section we focus on the existence of Nash equilibria. The concept of a Nash equilibrium is
particularly interesting in our context for it is a strategically stable and self enforcing equilibrium
6Following the ‘no-free-riding’ assumption we can state that the strategy of a player is the same as the group
strategy.
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(Mas-Colell et al. [1995], p. 249). Hence, it can be used as a ‘criterion of stability’.
Formally, we talk about a Nash equilibrium when there is an equilibrium in actions and
beliefs (Varian [1992], p 265): a player K (resp. L) has probability beliefs, piL (resp. piK), about
the strategy of L (resp. K) and chooses a certain strategy with probability pK (resp. pL). For
a Nash equilibrium we need that beliefs are correct, i.e. pK = piK and pL = piL, and that each
player is choosing his p so as to maximize his expected utility given his beliefs. Clearly, these
are relatively strong conditions. Therefore, in section 4 we propose an alternative approach to
analyze the existence of equilibria.
A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is a special case of a Nash equilibrium: each player’s
probability of playing one particular strategy is 1. So, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is
a strategy pair (X∗, Y ∗) so that uK(X∗, Y ∗) ≥ uK(X,Y ∗) and uL(X∗, Y ∗) ≥ uL(X∗, Y ) for all
X,Y ∈ {C,F}.
In the next paragraph we shall analyze which Nash equilibria in pure strategies arise for
varying parameter values (P, r, δ1, δ2). Note that (at least for now) we suppose that P is ex-
ogenous. This enables us to analyze the impact of, for example, external7 interference (∆P ) by
using simple comparative statics.
3.1 The payoffs
Case 1: (1 − α) < α < r. The economy has more rewarding jobs than there are people in
either group, which means that if one group dominates8, some randomly assigned members of
the other group will still be granted a rewarding job.
The (per capita) payoffs are:
uK(C,C) = rYR uL(C,C) = rYR
uK(C,F ) =
[
r−(1−α)
α
]
δ1YR uL(C,F ) = δ1YR
uK(F,C) = δ1YR uL(F,C) =
[
r−α
1−α
]
δ1YR
uK(F, F ) =
[
Pα+(1−P )[r−(1−α)]
α
]
δ1δ2YR uL(F, F ) =
[
(1−P )(1−α)+P (r−α)
(1−α)
]
δ1δ2YR
Obviously, the values of δ1 and δ2 will determine the types of equilibria that arise. Both
the relative size of r and δ1 and the relative size of δ2 and its critical value for each player,
CVH , matters. CVH is the ‘critical’ value of δ2 for which player H is indifferent between his two
strategies when the other player fights. It is defined as follows:
CVK = δˆ2K : uK(C,F ) = uK(F, F )
CVL = δˆ2L : uL(F,C) = uL(F, F ).
This means that CVK and CVL take the following values:
CVK = [r − (1− α)]/
[
Pα+ (1− P )[r − (1− α)]]
CVL = (r − α)/
[
(1− P )(1− α) + P (r − α)].
Since (1− α) < α < r we know that CVK , CVL ∈]0, 1].
In figure 1 we trace out the respective types of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We draw
the case in which CVL > CVK9.
7Think, for example, of troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, . . . intervening to support the Kinshasa regime against
Uganda-backed rebellion in August 1998 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly called Za¨ıre).
8Dominance reflects the situation in which one group manages to seize political and economic power. In the
present context this means that the dominant group is in control of the rewarding jobs.
9P = (α+ r − 1)/(2r − 1)⇒ CVK = CVL; P > (α+ r − 1)/(2r − 1)⇒ CVL > CVK .
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Figure 1: (1− α) < α < r
CVL
r0 1
1
δ1
δ2
CVK
CC
FF
FC
α 1− α
CC / FF
priors matter for
both players
CF / FC
priors matter for
both players
We can see that for sufficiently low values of δ1 and δ2 the cooperative equilibrium (a fully
integrated society) will come about. For high values of both δ1 and δ2 the non-cooperative
equilibrium (a conflictual society) results. When δ1 is low and δ2 is high, there will be two
potential Nash equilibria in pure strategies: either both cooperate or both fight (KC |LC or
KF |LF and LC |KC or LF |KF ). For high values of δ1 and low values of δ2, there are two other
potential Nash equilibria in pure strategies: either K cooperates and L fights, or K fights and
L cooperates (KC |LF or KF |LC and LC |KF or LF |KC), which results in a partially segregated
society, with respectively L or K dominating. Finally, for values of δ2 between CVK and CVL,
there will always be two pure strategy Nash equilibria: for low values of δ1 mutual cooperation
will arise, for high values of δ1 either K or L will cooperate, while the other will fight. Who
cooperates will depend on the relative size of their respective critical values for δ2 (cf. infra).
We shall interpret these findings in section 3.2.
Note that ∂CVK/∂P < 0, ∂CVL/∂P > 0 and that for P = 1, CVK = (r−1+α)/α [> 0;< 1]
and CVL = 1 and for P = 0, CVK = 1 and CVL = (r−α)/(1−α) [> 0;< 1]. In the area where
δ1 < r this implies that both when P → 1 and when P → 0, the CC-area is extended, since
either CVK or CVL → 1. This non-monotonous impact a change in P has on the equilibrium-
areas, derives from the fact that ∆P affects CVK and CVL oppositely and the fact that extreme
values of P (0/1) cancel one player’s ex ante probability to win the ‘fight’.
Furthermore, for r < δ1, the value of P will determine both the extent of the FF -area and
the type of equilibrium that arises between CVK and CVL: when CVK < CVL, strategy FC
is the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and when CVL < CVK , strategy CF is the
unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
In two areas in figure 1 there could also exist Nash equilibria in mixed strategies: the top
left area (TL : δ1 < r ∩ CVL < δ2) and the bottom right area (BR : r < δ1 ∩ δ2 < CVK).
However, in this paper we will not consider these Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. Instead,
in section 4 we shall provide an alternative approach to interpret these areas.
Case 2: (1−α) < r < α. The proportion of rewarding jobs lies in between the size of the two
groups. This is an asymmetric case: if K dominates, all members of L and even some members
of K will end up with a subsistence job. If, alternatively, L dominates, all members of L and
some members of K will get a rewarding job.
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The (per capita) payoffs are:
uK(C,C) = rYR uL(C,C) = rYR
uK(C,F ) =
[
r−(1−α)
α
]
δ1YR uL(C,F ) = δ1YR
uK(F,C) =
[
r
α
]
δ1YR uL(F,C) = 0
uK(F, F ) =
[
Pr+(1−P )[r−(1−α)]
α
]
δ1δ2YR uL(F, F ) = (1− P )δ1δ2YR
From these payoffs we calculate the values for CVK and CVL:
CVK = [r − (1− α)]/
[
Pr + (1− P )[r − (1− α)]]
CVL = 0.
Here, the relative size of δ1 to r and the relative size of δ2 to CVK determine the equilibria10.
Furthermore, since ∂CVL/∂P = 0, shocks in P only affect CVK , which induces a monotonous
relation between the value of P on the equilibrium outcomes: ∂CVK/∂P < 0.
Figure 2: (1− α) < r < α
r0 1
1
CVK
CC
FF
1− α α 
CF
δ1
δ2
CC / FF
priors matter for
both players
CV =0L
The equilibria are similar to those obtained in the previous case, with one exception: CVL =
0, which implies that for high values of δ1 player L (the smaller group) will always choose to
fight. For high values of δ1 and low values of δ2 player K will choose to fight only when L
chooses to cooperate and will choose to cooperate only when L chooses to fight. This implies
that there will be just one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: (C,F ).
Case 3: r < (1−α) < α. Finally, we consider the case where the proportion of rewarding jobs
is insufficient to cover either of the two groups, which means that whatever group dominates,
some members of that group will not be given a rewarding job.
10Note that by construction the analysis is symmetrical with respect to K and L.
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The (per capita) payoffs are:
uK(C,C) = rYR uL(C,C) = rYR
uK(C,F ) = 0 uL(C,F ) =
[
r
1−α
]
δ1YR
uK(F,C) =
[
r
α
]
δ1YR uL(F,C) = 0
uK(F, F ) =
[
Pr
α
]
δ1δ2YR uL(F, F ) =
[
(1−P )r
1−α
]
δ1δ2YR
The critical values, CVK and CVL, are both 0, such that the value of P does not matter for
the equilibrium outcomes. With r insufficient to provide everyone of the ‘winning’ group with
such a job, we can see that the relative size of δ1 to (1− α) becomes crucial: with δ1 > (1− α),
the only possible Nash equilibrium is the mutual fighting one, (F, F ). With δ1 < (1− α), there
are two potential Nash equilibria in pure strategies: either both cooperate or both fight.
Figure 3: r < (1− α) < α
r0 1
1
FFCC / FFpriors matter for
both players
1− α α  δ1
δ2
CV =0L
CV =0K
3.2 Overview of the model
We can distinguish six areas in the model: two in which the equilibrium is – so far – undetermined
(TL and BR)11, and four in which just one equilibrium results12 from the one-shot game:
δ1 < r ∩ δ2 < CVK (BL); δ1 < r ∩ CVK < δ2 < CVL (ML); δ1 > r ∩ δ2 > CVL (TR) and
δ1 > r ∩ CVK < δ2 < CVL (MR). This shows that case 1 can be viewed as ‘the general case’:
case 2 contains only four areas (ML and MR disappear), and case 3 contains just two areas,
TL and TR. Therefore we can focus on case 1.
Before turning to the analysis of TL and BR, we briefly summarize the three properties that
make up the core of the model presented so far. We shall also discuss these properties intuitively.
First, from figures 1, 2 and 3 we see that the size of the respective areas depends on – among
other things – the size of r relative to α: for r > (1−α), a rise in r generates a larger CC-area13,
while for r < (1−α), marginal changes in r have no effect. However, when a change in r causes
r to shift from < to > (1− α), structural changes in the possible equilibria result.
11These areas will be discussed in section 4.
12Remark that the way the equilibrium is realized, differs according to the area: in BL and TR, both players
play their dominant strategy. In ML and MR, on the other hand, the fact that for one player a certain strategy
is strictly dominated, implies that for the other player too one strategy becomes ‘dominant’.
13∂CVK/∂r ≥ 0; ∂CVL/∂r ≥ 0.
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This is a particularly interesting point if we interpret (1 − r) as the proportion of poor or
indigent people in the country, with at the one extreme a fully dispersed national income (r → 1)
and at the other extreme a fully concentrated national income (r → 0). This would imply that
a country with a highly concentrated national income is characterized by few rewarding jobs,
while a country with a highly dispersed national income contains many rewarding jobs14. Then,
in case 1 and 2, a reduction of ‘poverty’ (∆r > 0) would increase the range of parameter values
δ1 and δ2 for which a mutual cooperation equilibrium or, otherwise stated, a fully integrated
society could come about. Therefore, even for lower costs of non-cooperation (higher δ’s), a
country with a low degree of poverty could still reach full integration.
Second, δ1 and δ2 establish the relative attractiveness of the strategies. Thus, exogenous
shocks in these δ’s can change equilibrium strategies: if a – large enough – negative shock in
δ1 and δ2 would hit an economy, the country could experience a regime shift and evolve from,
for example, the FF equilibrium to the CC one. In other words, if the fighting option gets
more costly, cooperating could become the appropriate strategy for both players, which is a
very intuitive result.
In this interpretation, if a country with a high δ1 and δ2 attempts to reach the cooperative
solution, it will – among other things – need a high r or, vice versa, a country with a low r will
require low δ’s in order to reach cooperation. Intuitively, this means that a country in which
fighting does not really harm national income will require a low degree of poverty, such that
many people lose from non-cooperation, in order to reach a cooperative equilibrium. Now, if
we assume that exploitation or civil war are more harmful/detrimental to the national product
of a connected, diversified and service-industry oriented economy than to the national product
of a ‘primary-commodity-dependent’ economy15 (the latter is characterized by higher δ’s), the
analysis shows that for the latter to reach full integration, it will require a higher r, i.e. a more
‘dispersed’ national income and less poverty.
Third, although assumed exogenous, P plays a fascinating role, depending on the size of r
relative to α: in case 1, ∆P > 0 shifts CVL up and CVK down, which implies that when either
P → 1 or P → 0 the CC-area is extended. In case 2, ∆P > 0 still shifts CVK down, but
CVL = 0, which implies that the CC-area gets smaller. Finally, in case 3, ∆P > 0 has no effect,
at least not in the ‘unique Nash-equilibrium’ areas (cf. section 4).
If we interpret P as a measure of relative power of one group (here we assumed group
K), this analysis can generate valuable insights: in a country with a low degree of poverty
((1 − α) < α < r), extreme relative power (P → 0 or P → 1) maximizes the area that evokes
mutual cooperation. In a country with an intermediate degree of poverty ((1− α) < r < α) the
‘cooperative area’ grows with the relative power of the minority (group L in this case).
Clearly, within this model, P seems to be an obvious channel through which interested
parties could try to manipulate the outcome of the game. Intervention by foreign governments or
multinationals could change relative power, hence equilibrium strategies. However, the preceding
analysis should indicate that such ‘intervention’, although (ideally) bona fide, can have non-
trivial effects.
4 Trust and ‘out-of-equilibrium beliefs’
In this section we shall have a closer look at the impact of δ1 and δ2 on the chosen strategy of
the players in the two areas in which multiple Nash equilibria exist: TL and BR. Again, the
three cases differ: case 1 contains two areas with multiple Nash equilibria (TL, BR) while in
14Note that in the analysis we do not make any assumptions on the level of the rewarding income.
15By primary-commodity-dependent we mean that a substantial proportion of national income is generated by
natural resource extraction, e.g. mining.
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case 2 and case 3 only TL remains. The following analysis, however, holds regardless of the case
we consider. Hence, from here on we will only distinguish between TL and BR.
4.1 Priors
The analysis in the previous section exposes the rather ‘demanding’ nature of the concept of
Nash equilibria (both in pure and in mixed strategies): one needs an equilibrium in actions and
beliefs (cf. section 3).
In order to ‘relax’ this concept, we introduce priors: let pie be the priors or beliefs players
have over the other player’s willingness to cooperate, and pi∗ the value of pie for which a player is
indifferent between his own two strategies. Then (in our model), for a Nash equilibrium, pie = pi∗
is a necessary – but not even sufficient – condition. Obviously, this is not a trivial condition.
In a dynamic setting, one could indeed argue that in the long run pie would be evolving
towards pi∗ (cf. Coate & Loury [1993]). However, even then it seems reasonable to expect some
inertia in the adaptation process, which would mean that, at least in the short term, pie could
certainly differ from pi∗. In contrast, in a one shot game in which priors are exogenous, assuming
that pie = pi∗ holds would seem a rather strong assumption. The following framework allows pie
to differ from pi∗.
The areas where priors matter are TL and BR: i.e. the combination of values of δ1 and δ2 for
which the strategy of both players depends on their respective priors. As we can see from figure
4, for player K priors matter in TLK : δ1 < r ∩ CVK < δ2 and in BRK : r < δ1 ∩ δ2 < CVK
while for player L priors matter in TLL : δ1 < r ∩ CVL < δ2 and in BRL : r < δ1 ∩ δ2 < CVL.
Only the intersection of these areas (TLK ∩ TLL : TL and BRK ∩ BRL : BR) could yield
Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, since outside the intersection for at least one of the players
one of the strategies is strictly dominated by the other strategy.
Figure 4: Areas where priors matter
CVL
r0 1
1
δ  1
δ  2
CV K
α1− α
TLK
BRK
For player K
CV L
r0 1
1
δ 1
δ 2
CV K
α1− α
BR L
TLL
For player L
For example, in the present context (CVK < CVL), when δ1 < r, for player L strategy C is
a strictly dominating strategy for values of δ2 below CVL. This implies that between CVK and
CVL player K has to compare uK(C,C) and uK(F,C). Given the fact that we are considering
the case where δ1 < r, and given the fact that player L’s ‘undominated strategy space’ is singleton
{C}, we see that player K’s strategy will not depend on his priors anymore either: strategy C
strictly dominates strategy F . The analysis is analogous for r < δ1: for values of δ2 between
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CVK and CVL, player K’s ‘undominated strategy space’ becomes singleton {F}. Hence, player
L’s strategy choice is determined by the trade-off between uL(F,C) and uL(F, F ), which is
equivalent to comparing δ2 with (r − α)/
[
(1 − P )(1 − α) + P (r − α)]. This implies that for
δ2 > CVL player L will choose strategy F , otherwise strategy C is the dominant strategy.
4.2 Strategic behavior
Clearly, the strategy-choice depends on the expected utility of both strategies. Players use their
probability beliefs (cf. Nash equilibria: section 3) on the opponent’s willingness to cooperate to
assess the expected utility of their own respective strategies16: u
e
K(C, ·) = pieLCrYR + (1− pieLC )
[
r−(1−α)
α
]
δ1YR
ueK(F, ·) = pieLCδ1YR + (1− pieLC )
[
Pα+(1−P )[r−(1−α)]
α
]
δ1δ2YR.
Solving the equation ueK(C, ·) = ueK(F, ·) shows that player K will be indifferent to his two
strategies for:
pieLC = pi
∗
LC
=
(
Pα+ (1− P )[r − (1− α)])δ1δ2 − [r − (1− α)]δ1
α(r − δ1) +
(
Pα+ (1− P )[r − (1− α)])δ1δ2 − [r − (1− α)]δ1 .
Not surprisingly, but worth noting, we see that 0 < pi∗LC < 1 only when δ1 < r ∩ CVK < δ2
or when r < δ1 ∩ δ2 < CVK (i.e. TLK and BRK). The same holds for player L: 0 < pi∗KC < 1
only holds in the TLL- and BRL-area. Indeed, outside these areas the strategy does not depend
on beliefs anymore. We can easily see that ueK(C, ·) > ueK(F, ·) when δ1 < r ∩ δ2 < CVK ,
whatever the value of pieLC . Similarly, whatever the value of pi
e
LC
, when r < δ1 ∩ CVK < δ2 we
see that ueK(F, ·) > ueK(C, ·)17.
We can express the equation for pi∗18 in terms of the expected utilities:
pi∗LCuK(C,C) + (1− pi∗LC )uK(C,F ) = pi∗LCuK(F,C) + (1− pi∗LC )uK(F, F ).
By rearranging terms we get:
pi∗LC
[
uK(C,C)− uK(F,C)
]
+ (1− pi∗LC )
[
uK(C,F )− uK(F, F )
]
= 0.
Using the expressions for uH(X,Y ), this is equivalent to:
pi∗LC
[
r − δ1
]
YR + (1− pi∗LC )
[
[r − (1− α)]δ1 −
(
Pα+ (1− P )[r − (1− α)])δ1δ2](YR/α) = 0.
In these equations we can interpret the first term, pi∗LC [uK(C,C) − uK(F,C)], as ‘the ex-
pected advantage of cooperating when the other player cooperates’ and the second term, (1 −
pi∗LC )[uK(C,F ) − uK(F, F )], as ‘the expected advantage of cooperating when the other player
fights’. This formulation eases the interpretation of what happens if pieLC is different from pi
∗
LC
.
Since the interpretation differs depending on the area in the δ1δ2-square, we analyze them sep-
arately.
TLK-area. The area is defined by δ1 < r ∩ CVK < δ2. This implies that uK(C,C) >
uK(F,C) and uK(C,F ) < uK(F, F ) (cf. section 3.1), meaning that ‘the expected ad-
vantage of cooperating when the other player cooperates’ is positive while ‘the expected
16Although we consider player K, the analysis for player L is analogous.
17Outside TLH and BRH player H’s (∀H ∈ {K,L}) probability of playing a particular strategy is 1.
18pi∗LC is the value of piLC that yields a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
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advantage of cooperating when the other player fights’ is negative19. In order to be in-
different between his two strategies, player K needs pieLC = pi
∗
LC
. When, for example,
pieLC > pi
∗
LC
, we can see that the first term, the positive one, will be given more weight
than if player K were indifferent, meaning that the ‘expected advantage of cooperating’ is
positive (pieLC [uK(C,C)− uK(F,C)] + (1 − pieLC ) [uK(C,F )− uK(F, F )] > 0). Hence, for
pieLC > pi
∗
LC
player K will choose strategy C, while for pieLC < pi
∗
LC
he will choose strategy
F .
BRK-area. Here we know that r < δ1 and that δ2 < CVK . This implies that uK(C,C) <
uK(F,C) and that uK(C,F ) > uK(F, F ), meaning that ‘the expected advantage of co-
operating when the other player cooperates’ is negative while ‘the expected advantage of
cooperating when the other player fights’ is positive. Again, in order to be indifferent be-
tween his two strategies, player K needs pieLC = pi
∗
LC
. However, when pieLC > pi
∗
LC
, we
can see that the first term, the negative one, will be given more weight than it would if
player K would be indifferent. This means that the ‘expected advantage of cooperating’ is
negative (pieLC [uK(C,C)− uK(F,C)] + (1 − pieLC ) [uK(C,F )− uK(F, F )] < 0). Hence, for
pieLC > pi
∗
LC
player K will choose strategy F .
As we demonstrate in figure 5, combining these findings with the analysis in section 3.1
allows us to characterize all the equilibria within figure 1, for different values of pieLC and pi
e
KC
.
This yields four panels: panel i in which there is high mutual trust, panel iv in which mutual
trust is low, and panel ii and iii showing a case in which one player has a high trust level, while
the other has a low trust level.
4.3 The cost of ‘defection’
Some comparative statics show us what happens when the relative payoffs change. For this we
examine the impact of shocks in ‘the costs of defection’20 (δ1, δ2) within the TL- and BR-area.
Furthermore, it can be easily demonstrated that changes in P generate comparable results as
changes in the δ’s. Taking the first derivatives of pi∗ with respect to δ1, δ2 and P , we obtain:
∂pi∗LC/∂δ1 =
αr
[(
Pα+(1−P )[r−(1−α)]
)
δ2−[r−(1−α)]
][
α(r−δ1)+
(
Pα+(1−P )[r−(1−α)]
)
δ1δ2−[r−(1−α)]δ1
]2
∂pi∗LC/∂δ2 =
α
(
Pα+(1−P )[r−(1−α)]
)
δ1
[
r−δ1
][
α(r−δ1)+
(
Pα+(1−P )[r−(1−α)]
)
δ1δ2−[r−(1−α)]δ1
]2
∂pi∗LC/∂P =
αδ1δ2(1−r)
[
r−δ1
][
α(r−δ1)+
(
Pα+(1−P )[r−(1−α)]
)
δ1δ2−[r−(1−α)]δ1
]2 .
In figure 6 we show the impact of an increase in δ1, δ2 and P on pi∗21. We interpret the
interaction between the δ’s and pi∗ as the relationship between the ‘critical level of trust’22 (pi∗)
and the costs of ‘non-cooperation/defection’ (δ1, δ2). Furthermore, we interpret changes in P as
shocks in ‘relative power’.
We know that pi∗ depends on δ1, δ2 and P , and we assume that pie does not, which reflects
the fact that we treat the level of trust between the two groups as exogenous.
19To guarantee indifference of player K between his two strategies, in absolute value these two terms should be
equal to each other.
20By defection we mean that at least one player chooses not to cooperate.
21Note that for reasons mentioned earlier (cf. section 4.2) we restrict the analysis to the TL and BR area, even
though ∆δ1 and ∆δ2 could get us out of these areas.
22The ‘level of trust’ in our model is the belief one player has about the other player’s probability of choosing
strategy C, namely, the degree to which a player is confident the other player will be cooperative.
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Figure 5: Types of equilibria for given priors
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As we can see from ∂pi∗LC/∂δ1, ∂pi
∗
LC
/∂δ2 and ∂pi∗LC/∂P , the impact of ∆δ1, ∆δ2 and ∆P on
pi∗LC in the TL area is opposite to the one in the BR area.
TLK-area. Increases in δ1, δ2 or P induce a rise of pi∗LC : ∂pi
∗
LC
/∂δ1 > 0, ∂pi∗LC/∂δ2 > 0 and
∂pi∗LC/∂P > 0. This means that, for a player to choose strategy C with decreased costs of
‘not cooperating’ (∆δ > 0) or risen relative power (∆P > 0), a higher level of trust (pie)
will be required, which is a very intuitive outcome.
BRK-area. Here, the impact of changes in the δ’s and P on pi∗LC is opposite: ∂pi
∗
LC
/∂δ1,
∂pi∗LC/∂δ2 and ∂pi
∗
LC
/∂P all are < 0. This too generates an intuitive result: given the
fact that in the BR-area, when pie > pi∗, a player will choose strategy F (cf. section 4.2),
for a player to choose the cooperative strategy with decreased costs of ‘defection’ or risen
relative power, a higher level of trust will be required.
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Figure 6: Impact of ∆δ1 > 0; ∆δ2 > 0 (and ∆P > 0)
0 1
1
BR-area
pi  e
pi  *
pi  *’
pi  *pi  *’ pi  e
KC
KC
KC
LC LC LC
K
L
CC
CF FF
FC
0 1
1
TL-area
pi  e
pi  *’
pi  *
pi  *’pi  * pi  e
KC
KC
KC
LC LC LC
FF
FC CC
CF
K
L
4.4 Overview of the model
From section 3 we know that in the TL and BR area three potential Nash equilibria exist:
two in pure strategies, and one in mixed strategies. The principal contribution of this section
is the interpretation of situations where actions and beliefs do not coincide: within the ‘Nash-
equilibrium-framework’, we present an intuitive interpretation of out-of-equilibrium situations.
This analysis generates clear predictions in the undetermined areas, depending on his level
of trust (pie), relative to some ‘critical level’ (pi∗), which is the level of trust that would result
in a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Thereby, even incorrect assessments of the opponent
can lead to an equilibrium, which is a ‘relaxation’ of the Nash-equilibrium analysis that is quite
plausible in one-shot games23.
From the preceding analysis we see that, both in TL and BR, to reach the cooperative
equilibrium, i.e. a fully integrated society, with a low ‘cost of defection’, the reciprocal level of
trust will need to be high, which implies that, in countries where fighting hardly harms national
production, the level of inter-ethnic (or inter-religious . . . ) trust matters more.
Now, if we assume that fighting is least harmful/detrimental to the national product of a
‘primary-commodity-dependent’ economy (cf. supra), it follows that these economies will require
high levels of inter-ethnic trust in order to reach group cooperation.
Furthermore, we show that changes in P generate similar effects to changes in the δ’s.
This would imply that trust levels that prompted cooperative behavior beforehand, could elicit
fighting after the rise of P . Or, in other words, if one group gets relatively stronger, the minimal
required level of trust for which that group cooperates will rise.
Finally, the three main cases of our analysis clearly demonstrate that when poverty is very
high (case 3: r < (1 − α) < α), for the country to reach the cooperative equilibrium, the level
of inter-ethnic trust will be the key issue.
23In repeated games, expectations should be endogenous. The need to endogenize expectations is clear from
figure 5: if we take for example panel ii, player K has a lot of trust that L will cooperate, while L has little trust
that K will cooperate. These expectations are not confirmed by the resulting strategies, on the contrary.
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5 Conclusions
The model considers centrally governed regions or countries, which are populated by two social
groups (this could reflect ethnic, religious or social class diversity). The degree of diversity is
not specified, it can be very high or very low. Furthermore, the model assumes that national
income is optimized when (economic) group behavior is not affected by social affiliation: when
agents preferably or solely interact with agents of the same (social) group, this is assumed to
limit the economic potential of the region. Then, a fundamental assumption is that the degree
to which limited interaction restrains economic output differs among countries: when national
income primarily depends on revenues from exploitation of natural resources, we assume that
interaction matters less than in, for example, a service-industry oriented economy.
Within this framework we show that whether interaction will be ‘hampered’ by ethnic,
religious or social affiliations could depend on the country’s degree of poverty (the percentage
of subsistence jobs), and on the impact non-cooperation has on national income (the extent to
which national income depends on ‘economic interaction’).
This could explain why some regions fail to develop a ‘growth-promoting’ institutional frame-
work: the economic activity of many of the lagging countries seems to depend on the exploitation
of natural resources (cf. section 1). Since this type of economic activity is typically characterized
by a low amount of rewarding jobs and a low cost of non-cooperation, ‘cooperating ’ might not
be an equilibrium strategy among (socially diverse) groups. In other words, we show that segre-
gation (based on, e.g., ethnicity) could come as a ‘convenient excuse’, hiding economic motives:
under some circumstances it proves to be a utility-maximizing and equilibrium strategy to let
for example ethnic affiliation guide economic interaction.
Finally, we demonstrate the importance of inter-group trust. While it is clear that cooper-
ative behavior is encouraged by high levels of trust, our model shows that under some circum-
stances (e.g. strong ‘resource dependence’) even high trust-levels will be insufficient to incite
cooperative behavior among groups. When national income is easily (i.e. relatively costlessly)
creamed off, even high levels of inter-group trust can not guarantee cooperative group behavior.
A Elaboration of the five omitted cases
A.1 (1− α) = α = 1/2 < r
This case is very similar to case 1, except of course the fact that we consider equally sized groups.
The (per capita) payoffs are (note that α = 1/2):
uK(C,C) = rYR uL(C,C) = rYR
uK(C,F ) =
[
r−α
α
]
δ1YR uL(C,F ) = δ1YR
uK(F,C) = δ1YR uL(F,C) =
[
r−α
α
]
δ1YR
uK(F, F ) =
[
Pα+(1−P )[r−α]
α
]
δ1δ2YR uL(F, F ) =
[
(1−P )α+P (r−α)
α
]
δ1δ2YR
In this case, CVK and CVL become:
CVK = [r − α]/
[
Pα+ (1− P )[r − α]]
CVL = (r − α)/
[
(1− P )α+ P (r − α)].
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A.2 (1− α) = α = r = 1/2
The outcomes in this case are similar to those in case 3. The (per capita) payoffs are (again,
α = 1/2):
uK(C,C) = rYR uL(C,C) = rYR
uK(C,F ) = 0 uL(C,F ) = δ1YR
uK(F,C) = δ1YR uL(F,C) = 0
uK(F, F ) = Pδ1δ2YR uL(F, F ) = (1− P )δ1δ2YR
The critical values, CVK and CVL, are both 0.
A.3 r < (1− α) = α = 1/2
Again, we can refer to case 3 of the paper. The (per capita) payoffs are (α = 1/2):
uK(C,C) = rYR uL(C,C) = rYR
uK(C,F ) = 0 uL(C,F ) =
[
r
α
]
δ1YR
uK(F,C) =
[
r
α
]
δ1YR uL(F,C) = 0
uK(F, F ) =
[
Pr
α
]
δ1δ2YR uL(F, F ) =
[
(1−P )r
α
]
δ1δ2YR
And again, the critical values are both 0.
A.4 (1− α) < α = r
This is a case similar to case 2 in the paper. The (per capita) payoffs are:
uK(C,C) = rYR uL(C,C) = rYR
uK(C,F ) =
[
r−(1−α)
α
]
δ1YR uL(C,F ) = δ1YR
uK(F,C) = δ1YR uL(F,C) = 0
uK(F, F ) =
[
Pα+(1−P )[r−(1−α)]
α
]
δ1δ2YR uL(F, F ) = (1− P )δ1δ2YR
And we calculate the values for CVK and CVL:
CVK = [r − (1− α)]/{Pα+ (1− P )[r − (1− α)]}
CVL = 0.
A.5 (1− α) = r < α
Finally, this case is practically identical to case 3, with (per capita) payoffs:
uK(C,C) = rYR uL(C,C) = rYR
uK(C,F ) = 0 uL(C,F ) = δ1YR
uK(F,C) =
[
r
α
]
δ1YR uL(F,C) = 0
uK(F, F ) =
[
Pr
α
]
δ1δ2YR uL(F, F ) = (1− P )δ1δ2YR
And critical values are 0.
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